If we follow the German line of thought of the late 19th and early 20th century to its natural conclusions, the racial domination policies implemented during the Third Reich in the middle of the 20th Century become a direct sequel. The thinking was that the German people represented the highest and best of humanity, and by organising an efficient State along rational lines, these highest achievements could be brought to a high standard of perfection. The idea arose that there were genetic and racial characteristics that were predominant in the Teutonic races that gave them the advantage and the sole capability of the highest achievement. The rest of humanity was therefore an obstacle or drag on this highest development, or could at best become slaves or servants for the master race. Under Nazi rule, this led to the attempted elimination of Jews, Gypsies, Slavic or other subordinate groups of humanity who did not have, in their minds, the capacity to achieve the ultimate human development.
Sri Aurobindo described this phenomenon some 20 years prior to the actual ascension of the Nazi regime: “…all life not capable of this culture and this efficiency must be eliminated or trodden down, all life capable of it but not actually reaching to it must be taken up and assimilated. But capacity is always a matter of genus and species and in humanity a matter of race. Logically, then, the Teutonic race is alone entirely capable, and therefore all Teutonic races must be taken into Germany and become part of the German collectivity; races less capable but not wholly unfit must be Germanised; others, hopelessly decadent like the Latins of Europe and America or naturally inferior like the vast majority of the Africans and Asiatics, must be replaced where possible, like the Hereros, or, where not possible, dominated, exploited and treated according to their inferiority. So evolution would advance, so the human race grow towards its perfection.”
Sri Aurobindo, The Human Cycle: The Psychology of Social Development, Chapter 5, True and False Subjectivism, pp. 50-51